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Does stronger protection of intellectual property have effect on trade? 
 
Abstract 
In thus study we explore the association between patent protection and international 
trade, using data for 114 countries for the 2010-2015 years. Our results suggest non-linear 
(inverted U shape) link between IPR protection index and trade as a share of GDP.  
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Introduction  
 
International trade is considered one of the important underlying factors of economic 
growth (Frankel & Romer, 1999). Research shows that developing countries that adopted liberal 
trade policies had higher growth rates of GDP per capita (Dollar, 1992). For example, Harrison 
(1996) using data from developed and developing countries, find that various measures of trade 
correlate positively with economic growth. Therefore, the research on the causes of trade has 
grown considerably in size. In this study, we contribute to this literature by exploring the 
association between patent protection and trade.  
The research on the effect of patents on economy mainly explores its effect on economic 
growth. Hu & Png (2013) rely on a difference-in-difference method to explore the effect of patent 
protection change on 54 manufacturing industries in up to 72 countries between 1981-2000. They 
document that stronger patent rights were associated with faster growth among more patent-
intensive industries. Moreover, they report that effect of intellectual property is stronger in 1990’s. 
Thompson & Rushing (1996) investigate the association between patent protection and total 
factor productivity leading to higher GDP growth rates. This study reports that the effect of IPR 
may be non-linear and conditional on such aspects as GDP and structure of economy. However, 
in general patent protection has positive effect on economic growth.   
Imam (2005) in a review of potential effects of patent protection on economic growth in 
lower income countries concludes that ‘by creating stronger patent protection systems, 
developing countries can reduce the number of innovative scientists fleeing to developed 
countries to obtain better protection for their inventions’. Sattar & Mahmood (2011) explore the 
effect of intellectual property rights on rate of GDP change for a balanced panel of 38 countries 
(11 from high income countries; 16 from middle income countries; and 11 from low income 
countries) over the period of 1975-2005 by relying on Ginarte and Park Index of Intellectual 
Property Rights (2005). Their study shows that stronger protection fosters growth. But this effect 
is only marginal in countries that have not attained high income status. Moreover, the effect is 
stronger in middle income countries. More recently, Hu & Jaffe (2007) in a review of theretical 
evidence argue that ‘the strongest theoretical argument for benefit to developing countries from 
stronger IPR is that it will encourage innovation in areas specific to their needs. Evidence for the 
empirical significance of this effect is extremely limited. The only real example that has been 
identified is research on tropical diseases. It is widely acknowledged, however, that the largest 
barrier to significant private investment in this area is the lack of significant buying power for any 
potential cures, rather than weak IPR’.  
By and large, plethora studies seem to suggest that patent protection is positively related 
to economic development. In this study, we explore the effect of IPR protection on international 
trade on a sample of 114 developed and developing countries for the period 2010 - 2015. The 
results of the study show that patent protection is non-linearly related to international trade, as 
measured by trade as a share of GDP.  
 
Data and methods 
The dependent variable in this study is trade as a share of GDP as a proxy for international 
trade. The data comes from World Bank (2015). In our sample trade ranges from 25% of GDP in 
Brazil to 437% in Hong Kong. Figures 1 and 2 present the most and least trade open countries. As 
it can be seen, these countries are very heterogeneous in terms of their level of development and 
IPR protection. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 10 least trade open countries 
 Notes: Trade as a share of GDP, %  
 
 
Figure 2. 10 most trade open countries  
 
 
 
Notes: Trade as a share of GDP, %  
 
The main independent variable is IPR protection index from Park (2008). In his study, 
Park (2008) provides an revised edition to the index of patent protection published in 1997. The 
earlier papers has offered the index for 1960–1990 for 110 countries. The index has now been 
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revised to 2005 and enlarged to 122 countries. The IPR index ranges from 1.78 in Iraq to 4.88 in 
the USA. The higher values indicate stronger protection of intellectual property.  
To estimate the effect of IPR on international trade we estimate a simple regression model 
that can be expressed as:  
 
Trade = b0 + b1*Patent + b2*Patent2 + b3*GDP + b4*HC + e   (1) 
 
where trade is trade as % of GDP, patent is the IPR protection index, GDP is GDP per 
capita in PPP, HC is human capital index as measured by national IQs from Lynn & Vanhanen 
(2012) and e is an error term. We control for GDP per capita and human capital as they seem to 
be a catch all variable in our model (Salahodjaev, 2016a; Salahodjaev, 2016b). We also control for 
squared IPR index to capture any non-linear relationship. The main data stats are presented in 
Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Trade, % of GDP 114 90.19 61.81 24.86 437.33 
IPR index 114 3.42 0.81 1.78 4.88 
GDP per capita 114 18.04 17.64 0.64 88.16 
Human capital 114 85.03 11.69 60.1 107.1 
 
Results  
The main results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 is a simple bivariate regression 
between IPR index and trade. We find that patent protection is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. This suggests that a 1 point increase in IPR index is associated with 14 percentage point 
increase in trade openness. This specification explains only 3% of international trade.  
In column 2 we bring in two control variables GDP per capita and human quality index. 
First we find that GDP per capita is positive and significant at the 1% level. For example, if GDP 
per capita increases by 10,000 PPP then trade rises by 23 percentage points. The human capital 
index is insignificant in the regression. Turning to our main variable of interest we find that IPR 
is now again significant but negative. The VIF multicollinearity test is well below 10 thus, the 
estimate is not driven by potential collinearity among regressors.  
Finally, in column 3 we add squared IPR index. We now find that patent protection is non-
linearly related to international trade, and exhibits inverted U shape link. The international trade 
is highest in countries with moderate degree of patent protection. Moreover, countries with low 
levels of patent protection may benefit from strengthening intellectual property protection, while 
in countries with high level of IPR further increase in IPR index is detrimental for trade. This 
specification explains 28% of international variation in international trade.   
 
 
Table 2. Main results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patent 14.7765** -22.0461** 96.0606* 
 (7.0876) (9.3929) (51.5338) 
GDP  2.2735*** 2.4568*** 
  (0.4650) (0.4627) 
HC  0.2401 0.5666 
  (0.7238) (0.7233) 
Patent2   -18.3317** 
   (7.8699) 
Constant 39.6949 104.0948** -104.6226 
 (24.8826) (51.1092) (102.6646) 
N 114 114 114 
adj. R2 0.0288 0.2536 0.2824 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The natural question that arises how developing countries can increase IPR protection? 
We checked the hypothesis that IPR index may be driven by changes in quality of education, 
literacy and skills. Thus, we correlated IPR index with human capital index from Lynn & 
Vanhanen (2012). The visual representation of this correlation is presented in Figure 3. As 
evident, IPR protection quality crucially depends on the quality of human capital. 
 
Figure 3. IPR index and human capital 
    
 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade there has been ongoing debate on fostering trade in developing 
countries as trade is an important determinant of economic growth. In thus study we explored 
one potential channel which may lead to greater trade liberalization in less developed countries 
and indirectly increase economic growth. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that stronger IPR 
protection is beneficial for trade.  
Our study shows that, in contrast, to our expectations patent protection is non-linearly 
related to international trade. The international trade is highest in countries with moderate degree 
of patent protection. Moreover, countries with low levels of patent protection may benefit from 
strengthening intellectual property protection, while in countries with high level of IPR further 
increase in IPR index is detrimental for trade.  
Thus study has a number of limitation that is avenue for future research. First, due to the 
unavailability of IPR index on annual basis our study is limited to cross-sectional evidence. 
Second, taking into account non-linear association between IPR index and trade the use of more 
sophisticated methods to resolve the problem of potential endogeneity seems impossible in our 
research.  
However, the developing countries may improve their intellectual property protection by 
investing in human capital and building efficient institutions (Salahodjaev, 2015).  
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Appendix 1 
 
Economy 
WB 
code 
Trade, 
% of 
GDP 
IPR 
index 
GDP 
per 
capita, 
'000 
PPP 
Algeria DZA 66 3.07 13.20 
Australia AUS 41 4.17 42.54 
Austria AUT 103 4.33 44.15 
Bangladesh BGD 44 1.87 2.71 
Belgium BEL 163 4.67 40.62 
Benin BEN 65 2.93 1.79 
Bolivia BOL 82 3.43 5.79 
Botswana BWA 108 3.52 14.00 
Brazil BRA 25 3.59 14.97 
Bulgaria BGR 127 4.54 15.73 
Burkina Faso BFA 61 2.93 1.52 
Burundi BDI 44 2.15 0.72 
Cameroon CMR 46 3.06 2.67 
Canada CAN 63 4.67 41.87 
Central African Republic CAF 35 2.93 0.91 
Chad TCD 76 2.93 1.96 
Chile CHL 67 2.98 21.14 
China CHN 47 4.08 11.02 
Colombia COL 37 3.72 11.84 
Congo, Dem. Rep. COD 80 2.23 0.64 
Congo, Rep. COG 147 3.06 5.70 
Costa Rica CRI 77 2.89 13.59 
Cyprus CYP 102 3.48 31.71 
Czech Republic CZE 148 4.33 28.31 
Denmark DNK 100 4.67 42.87 
Dominican Republic DOM 56 2.82 11.53 
Ecuador ECU 59 3.73 10.32 
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 41 3.73 10.07 
El Salvador SLV 70 3.48 7.72 
Ethiopia ETH 43 2.13 1.23 
Fiji FJI 125 2.4 7.55 
Finland FIN 77 4.67 39.49 
France FRA 59 4.67 37.22 
Gabon GAB 85 3.06 17.60 
Germany DEU 84 4.5 43.04 
Ghana GHA 87 3.35 3.66 
Greece GRC 61 4.3 24.82 
Grenada GRD 76 3.02 11.05 
Guatemala GTM 59 3.15 6.86 
Guyana GUY 133 1.78 6.35 
Haiti HTI 73 2.9 1.58 
Honduras HND 115 2.98 4.55 
Hong Kong SAR, China HKG 437 3.81 50.35 
Hungary HUN 167 4.5 22.34 
Iceland ISL 103 3.51 39.81 
India IND 52 3.76 4.86 
Indonesia IDN 48 2.77 9.28 
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN 44 1.91 16.55 
Iraq IRQ 66 1.78 14.62 
Ireland IRL 200 4.67 45.64 
Israel ISR 66 4.13 30.88 
Italy ITA 56 4.67 34.80 
Jamaica JAM 82 3.36 8.41 
Japan JPN 34 4.67 34.99 
Jordan JOR 114 3.43 11.34 
Kenya KEN 53 3.22 2.67 
Korea, Rep. KOR 100 4.33 31.90 
Liberia LBR 153 2.11 0.77 
Lithuania LTU 155 4 23.72 
Luxembourg LUX 356 4.14 88.16 
Madagascar MDG 70 2.31 1.37 
Malawi MWI 65 2.15 0.75 
Malaysia MYS 146 3.48 22.71 
Mali MLI 56 2.93 1.48 
Malta MLT 178 3.48 28.27 
Mauritania MRT 118 3.27 3.49 
Mauritius MUS 115 2.57 16.65 
Mexico MEX 66 3.88 16.14 
Morocco MAR 81 3.52 6.85 
Mozambique MOZ 98 2.52 0.99 
Nepal NPL 48 2.19 2.11 
Netherlands NLD 150 4.67 45.73 
New Zealand NZL 57 4.01 32.81 
Nicaragua NIC 103 2.97 4.39 
Niger NER 63 2.93 0.87 
Nigeria NGA 40 3.18 5.31 
Norway NOR 68 4.17 63.62 
Pakistan PAK 32 2.4 4.38 
Panama PAN 139 3.64 17.90 
Paraguay PRY 96 2.89 7.31 
Peru PER 50 3.32 10.85 
Philippines PHL 64 4.18 6.04 
Poland POL 90 4.21 22.87 
Portugal PRT 76 4.38 25.95 
Romania ROU 79 4.17 17.82 
Russian Federation RUS 49 3.68 23.30 
Rwanda RWA 44 2.28 1.48 
Saudi Arabia SAU 81 2.98 48.83 
Senegal SEN 73 2.93 2.18 
Sierra Leone SLE 78 2.98 1.55 
Singapore SGP 361 4.21 75.63 
Slovak Republic SVK 176 4.21 25.51 
South Africa ZAF 61 4.25 12.37 
Spain ESP 60 4.33 31.66 
Sri Lanka LKA 50 3.11 9.98 
Sudan SDN 26 2.61 3.80 
Swaziland SWZ 117 2.43 7.73 
Sweden SWE 86 4.54 43.26 
Switzerland CHE 122 4.33 54.58 
Tanzania TZA 51 2.64 2.25 
Thailand THA 134 2.66 14.60 
Togo TGO 105 2.93 1.29 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 86 3.75 30.02 
Tunisia TUN 105 3.25 10.53 
Turkey TUR 56 4.01 18.03 
Uganda UGA 49 2.98 1.67 
Ukraine UKR 103 3.68 8.32 
United Kingdom GBR 60 4.54 36.77 
United States USA 30 4.88 50.55 
Uruguay URY 51 3.39 18.44 
Venezuela, RB VEN 50 3.32 17.70 
Vietnam VNM 164 3.03 4.91 
Zambia ZMB 68 1.94 3.50 
Zimbabwe ZWE 94 2.6 1.65 
 
 
 
